[Guerra da Coréia 2.0] Trump ameaça destruição completa da Coréia do Norte na ONU

[Ilellada]

certeza que kim vai dizer que trump arregou e o povo vai ovacinar.

 

[Sgt. Kowalski]

Acho improvável que afunde. No máximo deixá-lo fora de ação, com vários sistemas inoperantes. Para afundar um porta-aviões seria necessário ogiva nuclear ou o impacto de vários mísseis convencionais. Isso deixando submarinos e seus torpedos fora da equação.

Respondendo em spoiler pq é textão.

Spoiler

What It Would Really Take To Sink A Modern Aircraft Carrier

Robert Farley
Today 10:45am
Filed to: aircraft carriers
889

Pre-Commissioning Unit Gerald R. Ford heads out to sea for the first time under its own power for builder’s trials. The future USS Gerald R. Ford is the first in a new class of American supercarriers. Photo credit: United States Department of Defense

The modern aircraft carrier is a global symbol of American dominance, hegemony, peace, even empire. But at over 1,000 feet long, and displacing more than 100,000 tons, is it a sitting duck? Is the massive emblem of American greatness just an obsolete, vulnerable hunk of steel?

There’s a lot of consternation about whether or not the United States should even have massive supercarriers anymore. Obviously, the answer here is “depends on how much explosives you’ve got.” But while sinking an aircraft carrier is difficult, it’s not impossible. The key is what it’s used for, and who it’s used against. But if you wanted to sink one, here’s what you’d have to do, and what you’d be up against.

(Professor Robert Farley is a specialist in military diffusion, maritime affairs, and national security at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. He took exception to our original piece on carrier vulnerability, and seeing as how he’s an expert, we offered him a chance to do us one better. - M.B.)

A History Of The Modern American Aircraft Carrier
The U.S. defense community has debated whether or not aircraft carriers are a bit pointless since the late 1940s. In World War II, aircraft carriers became the decisive weapons of naval warfare. Technological developments at the end of the war put the carrier’s survivability into question, however. Precision-guided missiles (unmanned Kamikazes, in a sense) and high performance “true” submarines threatened to make carriers impossible to defend, especially in combination with nuclear weapons.

Nuke a carrier, and it’s sort of game over, really. Nuke anything and things tend to be over.

The first crisis over the future of the carrier came with 1949’s “Revolt of the Admirals,” in which the U.S. Air Force argued that aircraft carriers were so vulnerable that they represented an unwarranted expense; the Navy’s admirals, as the name suggests, practically revolted at this idea.

Eventually the United States would build its Cold War navy around families of “super-carriers,” each over 1,000 feet long, that began with USS Forrestal (CV-59) in 1955 and continues to this day with the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78).

These ships have become extraordinarily expensive, and they concentrate an enormous degree of firepower in one (potentially vulnerable) platform. Both during and after the Cold War, plenty of analysts – not to mention taxpayers – criticized the Navy’s fixation with the huge ships, and suggested that smaller, cheaper vessels could perform many of the same tasks.

For their part, the Soviets spent a great deal of time and money figuring out the best way to kill American carriers, especially after the Navy equipped its carriers with nuclear weapons. Today, China’s system of anti-access systems has made U.S. carriers the focus of its attention.

The Importance Of Aircraft Carriers
The core problem for every system dedicated to sinking aircraft carriers is the link between reconnaissance assets, or the things that can spot a carrier, and shooters, the things that can take one down. Submarines, aircraft, and surface vessels can’t kill carriers at range if they don’t know where those carriers are, and one of the notable differences between an aircraft carrier and an airbase is that the former, obviously, is mobile.

Even a supersonic cruise missile can take twenty minutes to reach its target area at maximum range, and a carrier maneuvering at high speed can move ten miles in the same period of time. A massive aircraft carrier can move surprisingly fast for something weighing over 100,000 tons, with a top speed of more than 30 knots, or about 35 miles an hour, which is what you get when you go for nuclear power.

The problem is complicated by the fact that the surface ships and submarines firing at such ranges cannot detect the carrier themselves; they need to operate off data provided by other assets, which tends to increase the time and uncertainty associated with targeting decisions. The United States has spent, essentially, 30 years developing and working out a reconnaissance strike complex that includes multiple redundant systems of surveillance and communication, resulting in a kill chain that transfers information in real time from advanced sensor platforms (satellites, submarine listening posts, drones, patrol aircraft) through communications nodes (satellites, aircraft) to ships, planes, and submarines that can launch and guide missiles to targets.

No other country has similar capabilities, even Russia and China.

Nevertheless, the Russians and the Chinese continue to try. Here are some of the measures that foes have taken to destroy aircraft carriers, and the countermeasures intended to defeat those foes.

THREAT: Torpedoes
Visualizar anexo upload_2017-4-20_13-33-17.gif
A portion remains of the North Korean torpedo believed to have sunk the South Korean warship ROKS Cheonan in 2010. Photo credit: Getty Images
No aircraft carrier has ever been hit by a modern torpedo of any sort, so we lack good evidence on how resilient a 90,000-ton ship might be to this kind of attack. The Navy tested a variety of underwater attack mechanisms against the retired Kitty Hawk-class carrier USS America in 2005, but the exact nature of the tests, and their results, remains confidential.

In World War II, submarines sank a total of eight fleet carriers from Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, beginning with HMS Courageous in 1939. And during the Cold War, the Navy identified Soviet nuclear submarines as a critical problem for carrier battle groups. As evidence from exercises indicates, submarines continue to pose a threat to aircraft carriers. To kill a carrier, a submarine needs to avoid escorts and patrol aircraft by either remaining stationary and waiting for a carrier to happen along, or by approaching a carrier quietly. In the open sea the latter is a difficult task, as carriers move at roughly the same speed as modern subs.


Navies closely guard the effective ranges of standard homing torpedoes, but most sources agree on 35 to 40 miles at maximum. Modern torpedoes explode underneath a ship in order to break its back and cause extensive, fatal flooding. The Russian Navy has developed extremely fast “supercavitating” torpedoes, but details on their operational status and practical effectiveness remains thin.

Counter-measures
The main solution to the submarine problem is to prevent submarines from moving into attack positions. Historically, this has involved multiple ways to detect and destroy enemy submarines, including carrier-borne anti-submarine aircraft, helicopters launched from escorts, land-based aircraft, and escorts themselves (including both surface ships and submarines).

During the Cold War, the Navy had enough confidence in its ability to find and kill Soviet subs that it could envision using carriers in major offensive operations against Soviet territory in the Arctic and in the Pacific.

Visualizar anexo upload_2017-4-20_13-33-17.gif
A Chinese sub transits during a 2009 fleet review. Photo credit: AP
The Navy’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability has decayed since the Cold War with the retirement of the S-3 Viking patrol aircraft and the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, but then Russia has fewer subs than it did during the Soviet period, and China’s long-range nuclear submarines are considered relatively loud and easy to track. Quieter diesels lack the legs to remain on station in the areas that aircraft carriers will operate, and the speed to keep up with the battle groups.

Submarines are not as easy to link into a system of command and control as aircraft and surface ships, either, and hence tend to react more slowly to intelligence. Nevertheless, a sufficient number of carefully deployed submarines can pose a significant threat to any carrier group. If all else fails, most submarines and surface ships carry a variety of counter-measures designed to confuse homing torpedoes. These include noisemakers and decoys intended to distract the torpedo; the Russians and Chinese have wake-homing torpedoes designed to defeat these defenses.

THREAT: Cruise Missiles
Visualizar anexo upload_2017-4-20_13-33-17.gif
The Yakhont, a Russian supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. Photo credit: Russian Ministry of Defence
The first naval cruise missiles saw duty in World War II, when German aircraft used precision-guided glider bombs to attack Allied and Italian ships. In the Cold War, the Soviets developed an array of platforms to launch cruise missiles against U.S. carrier battle groups, including submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. The USSR developed the Tu-22M “Backfire” bomber specifically to conduct cruise missile attacks against Navy carrier battle groups.

China has taken a similar approach, using a variety of different cruise missiles launched from different platforms to threaten US carrier groups. Most of these missiles travel to their target near sea level in order to avoid detection, popping up towards the end of flight in order to inflict maximum damage. This profile makes the missiles difficult, although not impossible, to engage with surface-to-air missiles and defensive fighter aircraft. Most cruise missiles require programming at launch, getting them to a specific area before they can identify and select targets on their own, but some missiles have more advanced systems that allow them to detect and discern between targets at long range.

Counter-measures
As with torpedoes, the way to avoid cruise missile attacks has been to prevent platforms from coming close enough to aircraft carriers to reliably launch their missiles. For surface ships the problem is relatively simple, and few expect that Chinese or Russian surface vessels can close to within reliable firing distance of a U.S. carrier before being destroyed, what with the wide-reaching net that American naval aviation can cast far in advance of a carrier group. Cruise missiles complicate the threat posed by submarines, but the principle remains the same; destroy the submarines before they can close within firing range. Aircraft launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) pose a different problem, as aircraft (due to altitude and the curvature of the earth) can identify a carrier group from greater distance than a sub or ship. To defeat aircraft, carrier groups rely on a combination of surface-to-air missiles (launched from Aegis cruisers and destroyers) and fighters flying combat air patrol.

In the Cold War, this evolved into a complex game between the U.S. and the USSR; the Soviets needed good intelligence to justify the launch of a large number of bombers, many of which they expected to lose. The Navy developed decoy techniques to trick the Russians into launching mass sorties, intended to gut Soviet capabilities and deter the Soviets from launching at all. The Navy developed the F-14 Tomcat to counter the threat of ALCMs; with a big radar and a long range air-to-air missile AAM, the F-14 could provide distant protection for a carrier battle group.

The Navy no longer operates F-14s, but the carrier air group still has combat air patrol responsibilities that include not only the destruction of attacking bombers, but also any drones and patrol aircraft that can report real-time data on the location and orientation of an aircraft carrier.

No cruise missile has ever struck an aircraft carrier, although missiles have had mixed results against smaller warships. Anti-ship missiles were used extensively during the Iran-Iraq War, and generally failed to sink large oil tankers. But a cruise missile can cripple a carrier by damaging its flight deck, even without sinking the ship.

THREAT: Go-Fast Boats
Visualizar anexo upload_2017-4-20_13-33-17.gif
Iranian naval speedboats. Photo credit: Iranian State Television
While the threat that small boats pose to major warships has been apparent for some time, the Pentagon’s Millennium Challenge 2002 exercise brought the issue to mainstream attention. In that controversial exercise, small fast boats carrying suicide payloads inflicted heavy damage on U.S. naval forces. “Red” strategy built off of the successful Al Qaeda attack against the destroyer USS Cole in 2000, as well as the history of Iranian small boat operations during the Iran-Iraq War.

Referees eventually prohibited some of the most effective Red techniques in order to give U.S. forces a fighting chance. Even a heavily laden suicide boat would struggle to sink a supercarrier, but they could give the crew a very bad day and reduce the ship’s effectiveness for an extended period of time.


Iran Blows Up Gigantic U.S. Carrier Mock-Up During Naval Exercise
The massive mock-up of an American aircraft carrier spotted nearly a year go accomplished its final …Read more

Counter-measures
Most small boats lack the range to find and successfully attack aircraft carriers in the open sea. Any boats that did find a carrier battle group would need to navigate a phalanx of well-armed helicopters and escort warships, most of which would boast actual Phalanx gun systems that could chew small vessels to pieces. As such, the only real threat the small boats pose to an aircraft carrier come from a surprise attack when the carrier is either stationary, or transiting a narrow, well-traveled section of ocean. These are serious, but hardly existential, threats to the future of the aircraft carrier.

THREAT: Ballistic Missiles
Visualizar anexo upload_2017-4-20_13-33-17.gif
In the late 2000s, intelligence emerged that China was developing a variant of its DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) that could hit mobile targets. The missile could purportedly maneuver in its terminal (approach) phase, making it possible to strike something as small as a moving aircraft carrier with a high degree of reliability. U.S. analysts believe that the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) can strike targets up to 900 miles from its launch position. But perhaps most importantly, the kinetic energy alone of the warhead, traveling at extreme speeds in its final phase, would devastate an aircraft carrier, leading at the very least to the end of its mission. Although it has received less attention, the Russian Iskander M short range ballistic missile (SRBM) can potentially perform the same trick.


This Is The Insane Video China Just Put Out Showing It Attacking The U.S.
A small group of Chinese Navy ships showed up near Alaska earlier this week during President…Read more

Weapons that haven’t been tested don’t exist, as the saying goes, and the DF-21D has not, to any visible indication, undergone realistic operational testing. Such testing demands much more than simply showing that the missile can terminally maneuver. It requires demonstrating the capability that the Chinese military can master every link of the kill chain between finding a carrier and putting a missile on its flight deck; there is no indication thus far that the PLA has conducted the kind of intensive training and testing necessary to ensure the capability. China has launched a number of surveillance satellites presumably designed to support the Df-21, but these satellites may not be reliable under wartime conditions. China could develop longer-ranged versions of the missile, but this simply multiplies the problems associated with target location.

Counter-measures
Still, the Navy has taken the ASBM threat very seriously. The U.S. response to anti-ship ballistic missiles involves a combination of basic offensive and defensive measures. On the offensive side, the U.S. expects to target enemy ballistic missile launchers in the early part of any conflict, although the effectiveness of strikes against targets that are either mobile or potentially hardened remains in great question. The US will also use electronic means of attack to blind enemy sensors, preventing them from relating accurate targeting data to launchers.


On the defensive side, the Navy will try to defeat ASBMs through kinetic and electronic means. The kinetic approach involves using interceptors (the Raytheon SM-3 Standard missile), based on Aegis-equipped escorts, to destroy the ASBMs as they approach the carrier. The electronic approach would involve targeting the terminal guidance systems of the missiles as they approach the carrier.

Without extensive realistic testing, we have no idea of the effectiveness of these counter-measures; they may depend on tactical factors (how much of an early warning there is, the distance to the target, and the number of missiles) unique to each engagement. But for every salvo of Df-21 ASBMs, we can expect that U.S. escorts will shoot some down, that others will fall harmlessly into the sea, and that some may strike U.S. ships, including aircraft carriers.

In case of war, China or Russia will attack U.S. carriers under the most advantageous circumstances, possibly including surprise. They will employ multiple systems in order to confuse and overwhelm U.S. defense. They will rely on the threat of attack to keep U.S. carrier battle groups as far as possible from the main theaters of operation. Thus, the U.S. Navy (and by extension, the U.S. government and the public) should take all of the above weapon systems seriously.

But the observation that the enemy has a missile or torpedo that can kill a carrier only begins a conversation about carrier vulnerability. Shooting anything at an aircraft carrier is a costly, difficult operation.

And beyond the monetary cost, launching an open attack against an American carrier strike group, with its own cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, is almost certainly a suicide mission.

So there are two questions that remain for anyone who thinks they even have a shot at taking down one of these enormous steel behemoths.

Can you do it? And even if you can, is it worth it?

Rob Farley teaches national security and defense courses at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. He is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force, and the Battleship Book. Find him on twitter @drfarls.

 

[Zefiris]

Even a supersonic cruise missile can take twenty minutes to reach its target area at maximum range, and a carrier maneuvering at high speed can move ten miles in the same period of time. A massive aircraft carrier can move surprisingly fast for something weighing over 100,000 tons, with a top speed of more than 30 knots, or about 35 miles an hour, which is what you get when you go for nuclear power.

Isso não é um problema grande quando se trata de mísseis de cruzeiro. O maior problema devia ser fornecer dados do alvo e de orientação de médio curso para os mísseis. Então os soviéticos teriam que sacrificar vários aviões de patrulha maritima. Mas fora isso, no estágio final, mísseis como SS-N-9 e AS-6 poderiam se orientar por seus próprios radares ou pelos sinais de radar do inimigo; e assim corrigir seu curso.

Talvez seja redundante dizer, mas em se tratando da Coréia do Norte, sua capacidade de vigilância maritima não deve chegar nem perto da URSS dos anos 70.

 

[Joey Tribbiani]

Zefiris,

Há alguma possibilidade dos EUA, Coreia e Japão invadirem a Coreia do Norte pelo mar, ar e terra, e nesse ínterim o Kim lançar mísseis contra Seul e o Japão?

Alguma possibilidade do Dia-D (Utah, Omaha) se repetir? Zoeira.

 

[Zefiris]

Zefiris,

Há alguma possibilidade dos EUA, Coreia e Japão invadirem a Coreia do Norte pelo mar, ar e terra, e nesse ínterim o Kim lançar mísseis contra Seul e o Japão?

Alguma possibilidade do Dia-D (Utah, Omaha) se repetir? Zoeira.

Em tempos modernos deve ser dificil ocultar uma operação do tamanho do Dia-D, e não vejo nem sinais tênues de algo assim a curto prazo. Embora eu não tenha prestado atenção na movimentação dos fuzileiros.

Em todo caso, é meio inevitável que a Coréia do Norte dispare alguns dos seus mísseis balisticos em tal cenário. Mesmo que seja uma batalha perdida. Excetuando, talvez, se neste ínterim houvesse um golpe de estado bem orquestrado.

 

[Jeovas]

Em uma guerra Best Korea vs EUA, vou torcer para a Best Korea. Eles são um câncer muito menor para o mundo.

Não produziram crise no oriente médio, ondas de refugiados na Europa, não financiaram o terrorismo rampante, nem inventaram ideologia de gênero e todas essas outras merdas pós modernas.

 

[luz do céu azul]

já foi previsto nos simpsons coreia do norte e a china atacaram os estados unidos

 

[Heretic.abortion]

Ia postar na pasta filmes, mas posto aqui mesmo.

Documentário sobre desertores da "Melhor Korea".

Tá legendado em PT

 

[Deleted member 219486]

Não entendi bem uma reportagem que vi na TV ontem, dava a entender que o navio americano deu uma enrolada para se dirigir a Coréia.

Na notícia sobre a China estar tentando conversar com a Coreia do Norte me parece que o país é o quintal deles.

 

[Bat Esponja]

Em tempos modernos deve ser dificil ocultar uma operação do tamanho do Dia-D, e não vejo nem sinais tênues de algo assim a curto prazo. Embora eu não tenha prestado atenção na movimentação dos fuzileiros.

Em todo caso, é meio inevitável que a Coréia do Norte dispare alguns dos seus mísseis balisticos em tal cenário. Mesmo que seja uma batalha perdida. Excetuando, talvez, se neste ínterim houvesse um golpe de estado bem orquestrado.

E se atacassem todos os brinquedos da Coréia do Norte em um dia de desfile?

 

[xogum]

Não entendi bem uma reportagem que vi na TV ontem, dava a entender que o navio americano deu uma enrolada para se dirigir a Coréia.

Na notícia sobre a China estar tentando conversar com a Coreia do Norte me parece que o país é o quintal deles.

Teoricamente as forças dos EUA, Coréia do Sul e Japão varreriam o grosso das forças da Best Korea em uns 3 dias.

O problema é iriam chover refugiados miseráveis pra China. Óbvio que a China quer isso de jeito nenhum.

 

[geist]

Ignorando o prejuízo humano de uma guerra, uma Best Korea liberta se tornaria (a médio prazo) um mercado consumidor bem interessante para a Coreia do Sul, China, Japão, Rússia e EUA. É que tem o lado geopolítico, senão aquela terra não seria o que é há muito tempo.

 

[xogum]

A parada está escalando, Rússia manda tropas para a fronteira com a Coréia do Norte.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4428384/Putin-sends-troops-Russia-s-border-North-Korea.html

Enviado de meu XT1563 usando Tapatalk

 

[Negão da Piroca]

A parada está escalando, Rússia manda tropas para a fronteira com a Coréia do Norte.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4428384/Putin-sends-troops-Russia-s-border-North-Korea.html

Enviado de meu XT1563 usando Tapatalk

 

[Malaquias Duro]

O Gordinho é muito burro.

Se tivesse ficado calado ficaria mais 300 anos comendo ppk e viajando pra Disney em paz.

Mas vai querer acreditar que é semi deus... Fico revoltado com a burrice humana.

Próxima geração de norte coreanos será de mestiços Russos, Chineses e Americanos.

 

[Léo Stanbuck]

A parada está escalando, Rússia manda tropas para a fronteira com a Coréia do Norte.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4428384/Putin-sends-troops-Russia-s-border-North-Korea.html

Enviado de meu XT1563 usando Tapatalk

É certo que Ucrânia e Síria já trazem problemas nas relações EUA/Russia. Um caso de guerra na Coreia do Norte e suas consequências que afetariam China e Russia, inevitavelmente, devem deixa a Russia ainda mais "chateada" com os EUA, e desta vez com suporte de outra super potência.

Os EUA precisam repensar muito bem no que querem fazer. Uma coisa é ficar de infantilidade só com a Russia, agora vai querer arrastar a China nesta brincadeira?

 

[Reisen Udongein Inaba]

O gordinho tá chamando pau!
Coreia do Norte alerta para ataque preventivo “superpoderoso”
Líder norte-coreano Kim Jong Un repudiou as repreensões de sua única grande aliada, a China, e leva adiante seus programas nuclear e de mísseis
Por Reuters
access_time20 abr 2017, 12h02 - Atualizado em 20 abr 2017, 12h12
chat_bubble_outlinemore_horiz

Kim Jong Un: Coreia do Norte ameaça destruir o Japão, a Coreia do Sul e os EUA com frequência (KCNA/Reuters)

Seul — A mídia estatal da Coreia do Norte alertou os Estados Unidos para um “ataque preventivo superpoderoso” depois que o secretário de Estado norte-americano, Rex Tillerson, disse que os EUA estudam maneiras de obter resultados da pressão sobre Pyongyang em reação ao programa nuclear norte-coreano.

O presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, endureceu a postura diante do líder norte-coreano, Kim Jong Un, que repudiou as repreensões de sua única grande aliada, a China, e leva adiante seus programas nuclear e de mísseis, afrontando sanções do Conselho de Segurança da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU).

O Rodong Sinmun, jornal oficial do governista Partido dos Trabalhadores da Coreia do Norte, não mediu as palavras.

“No caso de nosso ataque preventivo superpoderoso ser lançado, irá eliminar completa e imediatamente não só as forças de invasão imperialistas dos EUA na Coreia do Sul e nas áreas circundantes, mas os EUA continentais, e reduzi-los a cinzas”, disse.

A reclusa Coreia do Norte ameaça destruir o Japão, a Coreia do Sul e os EUA com frequência e não refreou sua agressividade nem mesmo depois de um teste de míssil fracassado no domingo, um dia depois de fazer uma grande exibição de mísseis durante um desfile na capital.

“Estamos analisando toda a situação da Coreia do Norte, tanto em termos do patrocínio estatal ao terrorismo quanto outras maneiras pelas quais podemos pressionar o regime de Pyongyang a se reengajar conosco, mas se reengajar conosco em uma condição diferente do que conversas passadas proporcionaram”, disse Tillerson a repórteres em Washington na quarta-feira.

O vice-presidente norte-americano, Mike Pence, que faz uma viagem por aliados asiáticos, disse mais de uma vez que a “era de paciência estratégica” com a Coreia do Norte acabou.

O presidente da Câmara dos Deputados dos EUA, Paul Ryan, disse durante uma visita a Londres que a opção militar deve ser parte da pressão por resultados.

“Permitir que este ditador tenha esse tipo de poder não é algo que nações civilizadas podem permitir que aconteça”, afirmou ele em referência a Kim.

Ryan disse ter ficado animado com os resultados dos esforços chineses para reduzir a tensão, mas que é inaceitável Pyongyang ser capaz de atacar aliados com armas nucleares.

http://exame.abril.com.br/mundo/coreia-do-norte-alerta-para-ataque-preventivo-superpoderoso/

 

[Mister Big]

Em uma guerra Best Korea vs EUA, vou torcer para a Best Korea. Eles são um câncer muito menor para o mundo.

Não produziram crise no oriente médio, ondas de refugiados na Europa, não financiaram o terrorismo rampante, nem inventaram ideologia de gênero e todas essas outras merdas pós modernas.

Isso foi sarcasmo né?

Enviado de meu SM-G530BT usando Tapatalk

 

[Bat Esponja]

O Gordinho é muito burro.

Se tivesse ficado calado ficaria mais 300 anos comendo ppk e viajando pra Disney em paz.

Mas vai querer acreditar que é semi deus... Fico revoltado com a burrice humana.

Próxima geração de norte coreanos será de mestiços Russos, Chineses e Americanos.

Pô vai ser a nova master race lol

 

[xogum]

Pô vai ser a nova master race lol

Nordkorea über alles.

 

[Zefiris]

A parada está escalando, Rússia manda tropas para a fronteira com a Coréia do Norte.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4428384/Putin-sends-troops-Russia-s-border-North-Korea.html

Ainda não li nada a respeito em sites russos ou focados nos russos. Embora não signifique necessariamente que a noticia seja falsa.

 

[xDoom]

Minha tese é que o alto escalão do exército americano seja da guilda do @Zefiris no final fantasy, não tem condição do cara manjar tanto sem ter uns informantes.

Será que o grande líder faz parte dos que sofreram lavagem cerebral e também acredita que ele de fato é o escolhido?

 

[Zefiris]

Minha tese é que o alto escalão do exército americano seja da guilda do @Zefiris no final fantasy, não tem condição do cara manjar tanto sem ter uns informantes.

Que exagero. Eu apenas tento interpretar as entrelinhas dos acontecimentos. E mesmo que eu tenha um palpite bem fundamentado sobre isso ou aquilo, não deixa de ser um palpite passível de erro.

De todo modo, a Square mantém registrado todos os logs de conversa de FFXIV. É meio temerário supor que alguém manteria conversas sigilosas lá.

 

[Zefiris]

O porta-aviões Carl Vinson está hoje no mar de Celebes. Perdeu um caça F/A-18E durante manobras de aproximação. O piloto conseguiu se ejetar em segurança.
https://news.usni.org/2017/04/21/super-hornet-uss-carl-vinson-crashes-near-philippines-pilot-safe

Parece que agora ele vai mesmo para a peninsula coreana. Mas ainda está meio longe.

 

[Coffinator]

War With North Korea Could Mean A Refugee Crisis No One Is Ready For

In this Saturday, April 15, 2017, file photo, soldiers march across Kim Il Sung Square during a military parade in Pyongyang, North Korea to celebrate the 105th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung. (AP Photo/Wong Maye-E, File)

Much of the discussion around North Korea has focused on a nuclear or conventional war between Pyongyang and Washington, but little has been mentioned about one crucial topic: if the Kim regime fails and the country collapses, it will result in an unprecedented refugee crisis. For all of the tough talk by the U.S. as of late, the reality is that South Korea and China—not America—will be left to deal with the human toll of an armed conflict.


What Happens Next With North Korea
North Korea had the world on edge last week when it paraded new and improved weapons through…Read more

On Tuesday, my colleague Gary Wetzel wrote that some 80,000 South Koreans in Seoul could perish after a week of conventional fighting alone due to North Korea’s artillery capabilities. Last year, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea warned a conflict with North Korea could mirror World War II.

Additionally, if Pyongyang collapses as a result, it could lead to hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of people searching for food and shelter and refugees fleeing for China and, depending on the circumstances, South Korea.

Why China Has To Care
Various powers have fought for control over the Korean peninsula for centuries, but it is what has taken place over the past 120 years that has most shaped the present reality. Imperial Japan made Korea its protectorate in 1905 after defeating the Russian Empire during its one-year Russo-Japanese War. Korea was ruled by the Japanese up until the end of World War II. Japan’s rule was so repressive that Koreans were conscripted into labor and even pressured to change their names to Japanese names.

After Japan surrendered to the U.S. in 1945, the former Soviet Union and Washington split Korea along the 38th parallel, which is now known as the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In the North, the Soviets installed Kim Il-sung; in the south, the U.S. picked Syngman Rhee, a staunch anti-communist strongman.

The goal was to keep Korea under a “trusteeship” for five years, but Koreans tired of foreign rule and resisted the idea from the start. As Koreans fought to regain control of their country, the USSR and the U.S. were in an early Cold War power struggle over who would decide its fate as well. Meanwhile, from around 1948 to 1950, North and South Korean forces engaged in military battles along the DMZ until the North invaded the South in June 1950.

The North took control of much of the South, until the U.S. pushed them back past the border. The United Nations controlled the North until China stepped in and restored communist rule. Since then, China has been Pyongyang’s biggest political ally and economic backer. In fact, China accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea’s trade volume. Relations between Pyongyang and Beijing began to sour in 2006 when the North conducted its first nuclear test. In 2013, China endorsed UN sanctions against North Korea, but has still continued to support Pyongyang.

Its reasons for doing so are complex. China wants as stable a North Korea as possible on its border. A collapse of its government could create a humanitarian disaster for China, and moreover, North Korea provides a buffer zone between China and South Korea. A fall of the North could potentially bring U.S. troops closer to China’s border and Beijing certainly doesn’t want that. It already protests the recently deployed Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.
The U.S. recently deployed the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea to …Read more

That is why China has been treating the North Korean nuclear situation so delicately. U.S. President Donald Trump has, until very recently, accused Beijing of not taking the threat of a Pyongyang nuclear attack seriously; until he changed his tune, that simply was not true. China has much more to lose than the United States in the long run.

As it stands, China, still supports North Korea, but does so begrudgingly. The same power Beijing had over Pyongyang in 1953 does not exist in 2017. Sure, it has official diplomatic ties with the North’s leadership, but the issue of nuclear weapons and the geopolitical dilemma they would cause complicates matters. North Korea is a powder keg of geopolitical problems and China can be directly impacted by all of them—and in the most severe manner. For now, the humanitarian crisis is one that really scares Beijing.

The Refugee Crisis In The Making
A mass migration of refugees trying to enter China through its northern Liaoning and Jilin provinces would present complex economic, infrastructure, and cultural and political challenges. Jim Walsh, a senior research associate at MIT’s Security Studies program and one of the few Americans to travel to North Korea to speak with officials about nuclear issues, told me a North Korean government collapse could potentially threaten China’s political stability.

“If your number one national interest is social stability, economic growth in order to hold on to social stability, having six million foreigners into provinces that have already had economic hardships before (won’t help),” said Walsh, who is also a board member at The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

He added: “And from a social stability standpoint—refugee camps with millions of North Koreans? Are the Chinese living there going to be thrilled about that in a context in which the economy is taking a hit because there’s been a shooting war? The Chinese are going to be overly sensitive about this and will air on the side of caution.”

Foxtrot Alpha spoke with experts who have been researching what could happen if an armed conflict broke out between the U.S. and North Korea and we broke down the scenarios below.

Keep in mind that most of this is hypothetical, but now is as good a time as ever to think through the humanitarian lens what a war between the U.S. and North Korea could mean for China and South Korea.

Is China Even Set Up To Absorb Millions Of Refugees?
Generally, no. It also depends if millions of people will flood China at all. Most of the experts I spoke to say the Chinese have long feared such a scenario and would proactively reinforce the border with troops to minimize massive population flows.

Andrew Scobell, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, said we have to keep in mind the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs), too. Not everyone in North Korea will flee to China. Some may travel from one city to avoid conflict or search for food and shelter. It would be nearly impossible to cross into South Korea through the DMZ because intense fighting would likely be happening there.

For those North Korean refugees who live near the Chinese border and attempt to cross over, Scobell says they will likely be stopped by the military.

“They’re quite likely to see the movement of Chinese forces across the Yalu River to establish a buffer, whether it’s 10 kilometers, 20 kilometers, something along those lines to protect China,” Scobell said. “That’s where they would attempt to set up an infrastructure to take care of refugees. In other words, [the military] would rather they’d not get into China in the first place. That would still be a major undertaking and a challenge. But I think the preference of the Chinese government would be to set up refugee camps south of the border.”

Let’s start off with the fact that the term “refugee” is a blurry term in China to begin with. Yun Sun, a senior associate at The Stimson Center, a nonprofit global security think-tank, told me China, for example, doesn’t work with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) on refugees in China.

“In fact, China does not have a record of recognizing ‘refugees’ in China,” she said. “The term, for China, has political implications and could invite foreign interference on how China handles them. The refugees in Myanmar are called ‘residents along the border.’ And the defectors from North Korea are called ‘People who left the North.’”

Beijing’s relationship with UNHCR is complicated, Yun says, because it sees the body as having played supportive role to Uyghurs—a Muslim ethnic group who suffered under Chinese rule—who fled that country for other parts of Southeast Asia.

Part of the issue, as Foreign Policy wrote last year, is that China lacks the infrastructure to even handle mass immigration—the Chinese government doesn’t even offer assistance to refugees.

How Would South Korea Deal With Refugees
It seems most logical to outside observers that North Korean refugees would head to South Korea; the two were once the same country and they share an ancestry and language. That all makes sense on paper. But it too would be burdened with a bevy of cultural and political challenges massive numbers of North Korean refugees would pose.

Let’s say China ends up taking in the vast majority of North Koreans, as most experts I spoke with believe. It is very likely that Beijing would ask the United States and South Korea to share the economic burden of caring for them.

Go Myong-Hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul who has researched North Korean refugees in South Korea, told me it is likely that China would persuade South Korea, the U.S., and the international community to share the economic burden of supporting them. From Go’s standpoint, Seoul would struggle to deal with a high number of refugees.

“South Korea’s population is around 50 million,” he said. “A sudden influx of North Korean refugees is going to be incredibly stressful to the social service infrastructure and the labor market in South Korea,” he added. “North Koreans are entitled to the same rights and benefits as South Koreans by South Korean law, so there is no way the government can prevent North Korean refugees from demanding and receiving social benefits.”

The Culture Clash
Go conducted a study of North Korean refugees in South Korea and found that many of them bring issues of PTSD, a lack of adequate education and poor health. For example, North Korean middle and high school kids dropped out at a range between 4.2 and 7.5 percent between 2010 and 2013 compared to 1.2-1.3 percent among South Korean students during the same time frame.

Attitudes towards South Koreans in the workplace isn’t much better, according to his report:

A survey by the Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI) (2013) showed that out of 429 elementary and middle school North Korean refugee students, 10.7 percent of them reported being discriminated against or socially ostracized due to the fact that they were from North Korea. Fifty-four of them also reported that they would not let their South Korean peers know they came from North Korea if they were given the chance to transfer to a different school.

Experts also point out that teachers who most interact with North Korean refugee students most are more often than not inadequately trained to handle their needs, and as the result they tend to cause more harm than good.

Similarly, North Korean refugees in the workplace report having similar experience of social discrimination by their co-workers and superiors. For example, one employer whose employee is from North Korea expressed fear that his employee might kill others if provoked emotionally (Choi and Park, 2011). This prejudice stems from hearing or watching news that in North Korea, public executions are common. Even after taking into account the inevitable cultural misunderstandings in when dealing with recently arrived North Korean refugees, South Koreans’ strong prejudice and stereotyping of North Korea and its people are widespread and well entrenched.

Yun said a lot of South Koreans suspect North Koreans of being spies. This is a very real fear, as North Korea does send spies to the south to gather intelligence. That’s why South Korea’s National Intelligence Service holds North Korean defectors for up to six months to determine if they are spies or not. They are then placed in a re-education facility for three months to learn how to adjust to South Korean life.

So far, 30,000 people have defected from North Korea. Imagine the cultural and infrastructure challenges that even double that number of refugees can pose. Or, say, hundreds of thousands, in the event of an armed conflict that forces Pyongyang to fall.

That would be a lot of people for the South’s intelligence agencies to assess and its social services to integrate into South Korean society. And, given the current Trump administration’s anti-immigration stance, it is likely America would not be enthusiastic about taking many North Korean refugees either.

What is important to consider in all of this is that nothing good will come of a pre-emptive strike against North Korea. If the U.S. attacks first, that will likely trigger a military offensive against South Korea and a full-scale war will follow.

Despite more tough talk from the U.S. and allies, North Korea seems dead set on more missile tests…Read more

Say Pyongyang falls during such a war. That would leave China, the U.S. Japan and Russia (which, you’ll recall, installed its communist leadership after World War II in the first place) in charge of rebuilding it—pretty much the same players who had a role in the future of the Korean peninsula in 1945. Well, as you can see, that didn’t work out too well.

And, if you’ve been paying attention to America’s handiwork in Iraq and Afghanistan, you’ll note the U.S. is pretty bad at nation building as of late.

In the end, we have world powers deciding the fate of Korea—again. And a military approach is the primary solution the current White House administration has to deal with North Korea. Wars over the Korean peninsula have not historically produced peace and stability, so it is unlikely that one lead by Trump will convince Kim Jung-un to change his behavior either.

What is likely to follow a war against North Korea is millions of people who have to be managed, many of whom would likely not want to be told what to do by outsiders—even if they do in fact despise the Kim family. Something tells me China does not want to even think about that problem. And neither does South Korea, which, by the way, doesn’t even have a president at the moment.

 

[Motorista Russo]

O Gordinho é muito burro.

Se tivesse ficado calado ficaria mais 300 anos comendo ppk e viajando pra Disney em paz.

Mas vai querer acreditar que é semi deus... Fico revoltado com a burrice humana.

Próxima geração de norte coreanos será de mestiços Russos, Chineses e Americanos.

Se pegar o melhor de cada nacionalidade, melhor! Mas, infelizmente, não é o que acontece.

 

[xogum]

Os EUA podiam fazer um acordo com a China: você deixa acabar com o regime norte coreano, o governo do sul anexa o norte, segura os refugiados e as tropas americanas saem da península de vez.

Enviado de meu XT1563 usando Tapatalk

 

[JeanJacquesRosseau]

Os EUA podiam fazer um acordo com a China: você deixa acabar com o regime norte coreano, o governo do sul anexa o norte, segura os refugiados e as tropas americanas saem da península de vez.

Enviado de meu XT1563 usando Tapatalk

Sim e em 2 anos a gente pode chamar metade da Ásia de Império Chinês.

 

[Zefiris]

Os russos tem estado meio ativos na área do Pacífico. Não só ficam passeando em volta do Japão, como seus aviões também tem sido detectados perto dos EUA e Canadá.

17 de abril: 2 bombardeiros estratégicos Tupolev Tu-95MS se aproximaram a 100 milhas do Alasca, o que provocou a saida de um avião AWACS E-3 da base aérea de Elmendorf. Embora o Tu-95 não seja exatamente um avião discreto (sua imagem no radar deve ser enorme com aquelas hélices), os americanos enviaram um E-3 para ter certeza que não houvesse outros aviões ocultos sob esses bombardeiros indiscretos.

18 de abril: 2 bombardeiros estratégicos Tupolev Tu-95MS se aproximaram a 36 milhas das ilhas Aleutas.

19 de abril: 2 aviões de patrulha maritima Ilyushin Il-38 se aproximaram das ilhas Aleutas.

20 de abril: Novamente 2 Tupolev Tu-95MS em ação, dessa vez se aproximando do Canadá e EUA. Dois caças F-22A sairam a seu encontro.

 

[Warlocker]

Topete séqsi...

Eu acho a divisão da Coreia um dos fenomenos geograficos mais ironicos da historia. Nasceu puramente do fato que as duas maiores nações do mundo se aliaram na segunda guerra mundial e dai convenientemente resolveram lembrar que se odiavam enquanto dividiam um pais. Just happens...

 

[Léo Stanbuck]

Os EUA podiam fazer um acordo com a China: você deixa acabar com o regime norte coreano, o governo do sul anexa o norte, segura os refugiados e as tropas americanas saem da península de vez.

Enviado de meu XT1563 usando Tapatalk

Eu imagino que isso não seria muito interessante para a China, já que unir as duas Coreias poderia não apenas criar uma nova potência econômica regional como também militar, já que transformaria uma "grande Coreia" em um país com popular de mais de 70 milhões de habitantes e uma faixa de extensão de terra bastante proveitosa.

A permanência da Coreia do Norte para a China é agradável. Eles mantém um país pouco importante no cenário regional, abrem a distância ao imperialismo estadunidense e encontram um aliado pouco ortodoxo, o que garante melhor controle.

E os Estados Unidos não irão sair nunca da península coreana. Cada canto desse planeta tem base militar dos estados unidos, e com a super potência Chinesa crescendo cada vez mais, e sendo a Russia o país do outro lado da China, os Estados Unidos tem pouco espaço de mobilidade militar ao redor da China.

 

[sparcx86_GHOST]

Sim e em 2 anos a gente pode chamar metade da Ásia de Império Chinês.

Realmente isso não pode acontecer, EUA é quem segura Coreia do Sul, Japão e outros tigres asiáticos fora da influencia chinesa. Acho mais viável manter a cortina de ferro como está!
d40343bc98fd67d9d0f77c955904a076

 

[Jeovas]

Sobre essa possível guerra contra a Best Korea: eu duvido muito que irá acontecer. Agora, se atacarem o gordinho, esperem retaliação nuclear. Coréia do Sul irá sofrer danos monstros.

O melhor é controlar a situação via China, o que com certeza os americanos irão fazer - até porque o Kim Jong-Un não manda no país sozinho.

Isso foi sarcasmo né?

Enviado de meu SM-G530BT usando Tapatalk

Não.

Mas, me explique. Por que você acha que a Best Korea é mais nefasta ao mundo que os EUA?

O gordinho não vai explodir nukes aleatoriamente, ele não é o mini-me. Se fosse para fazer isso, já o teria feito. Este é um momento em que o ocidente está pressionando forte porque brevemente ele terá alguns ICBM, e aí bye bye qualquer plano de mudança de regime. É quase a mesma situação do Irã - país "hostil" próximo de aliados americanos. (com a diferença que EUA/Israel conseguiram "persuadi-los" - http://www.valor.com.br/internacion...raniano-e-morto-em-explosao-de-bomba-em-teera).

E isso não é de hoje. Só cê ver que pelos menos desde metade do séc. XIX eles tão nessa, lol. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perry_Expedition)

De qualquer maneira, não acredito que haverá qualquer conflito por agora. Se houver, os coitados norte coreanos vão fazer os Sírios sentirem que estão em um parque de diversões. Então, sim, EM UMA GUERRA COMEÇADA PELOS EUA, algum dano nos EUA seria algo bom para ver se eles passam a rever essa política externa do "Big stick".

 

[Zefiris]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea
"List of border incidents involving North Korea"

Centenas de pessoas já morreram desde que as Coréias assinaram o armistício em 1953 até a década atual. Civis incluidos, já que a Coréia do Norte acha bonito atacar do nada povoados do Sul com artilharia.

 

[soltonatural]

Eu duvido de que a Best Korea tenha capacidade nuclear plena. O que eles tem é um dos exércitos mais bem treinados do mundo, mas isso não vale muito com a maquina de guerra sucateada e falta de suprimentos, nenhuma guerra pode ser levada por muito tempo sem isso.
Os EUA massacrariam eles em questão de dias.